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Abstract—There is no widely accepted way of measuring
the level of security of a recognition-based graphical password
against guessing attacks. We aim to address this by examining the
influence of predictability of user choice on the guessability and
proposing a new measure of guessability. Davis et al. showed that
these biases exist for schemes using faces and stories, we support
this result and show these biases exist in other recognition-
based schemes. In addition, we construct an attack exploiting
predictability, which we term “Semantic Ordered Guessing
Attack” (SOGA). We then apply this attack to two schemes
(the Doodles scheme and a standard recognition-based scheme
using photographic images) and report the results. The results
show that predictability when users select graphical passwords
influence the level of security to a varying degree (dependent
on the distractor selection algorithm). The standard passimages
scheme show an increase on guessability of up to 18 times more
likely than the usual reported guessability, with a similar set up
of nine images per screen and four screens, the doodles scheme
shows a successful guessing attack is 3.3 times more likely than a
random guess. Finally, we present a method of calculating a more
accurate guessability value, which we call the revised guessability
of a recognition-based scheme. Our conclusion is that to maximise
the security of a recognition-based graphical password scheme,
we recommend disallowing user choice of images.
I. INTRODUCTION
Users need to prove they are who they claim to be (au-
thenticate) for many services, such as online banking, e-mail
and e-commerce. Currently, alphanumerical passwords are the
authentication mechanism of choice. However, passwords have
a number of well documented problems associated with them,
such as use of weak passwords and lack of memorability
([1],[7]). As an alternative, graphical passwords are often
discussed (e.g. [9]). A graphical authentication mechanism is
one in which the user is asked to select an image, points on
an image, or draw an image in order to authenticate. Such
schemes can be separated into three categories; recognition-
based, recall-based and cued-recall [2].
This work concerns recognition-based schemes, in these
schemes the user selects a number of “passimages”. In order
to authenticate they are presented with a number of “challenge
screens”. On each challenge screen, the user is shown one of
their chosen images and a number of alternative “distractor”
images. The user must then select their image from the distrac-
tor images for each challenge screen presented to successfully
authenticate.
Whilst the security of cued-recall ([12],[13]) and recall-
based schemes ([14]) have been researched in terms of pre-
dictability, the security of recognition-based schemes remains
to be examined in equivalent depth. This work aims to be a
step towards examining the level of security of such schemes.
User choice influences the security of passwords by making
them susceptible to dictionary attacks and hence may also in-
fluence the security of recognition-based graphical passwords.
This is highlighted by De Angeli et al. [5] who noted that the
issue of predictability in user selected passimages still requires
evaluation. This research assesses whether predictability of
user choice affects the security level of recognition-based
schemes and constructs an attack based on this predictability.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Researchers often report a chance of guessing (or guess-
ability) for recognition-based graphical passwords as shown
in Equation 1
1
Xn
(1)
where X is the number of images displayed on a challenge
screen and n is the number of challenge screens (e.g. [4] and
[6]).
Whilst the majority of work reports the guessability as
described in Equation 1, Davis et al. progress further. In “On
User Choice in Graphical Password Systems” [4] the authors
implement two recognition-based schemes, Face and Story.
Face was based on the PassFaces scheme created by Id-Arts
Ltd.. The Story scheme let the user select a sequence of images
to construct a “story” password, where each image selected
was from a distinct category (e.g. cars, landscapes etc.). In both
the schemes, the images are categorised into non-overlapping
subsets of images (e.g. typical male, typical female etc. for the
Faces scheme and cars, landscapes etc. for the Story scheme).
The assumption was then made that the images in any given
category are equivalent .
The authors then examined user choice of passimages in
each category to determine the probability order (most chosen
category to least chosen category). The authors used infor-
mation resulting from the experiment to calculate guessing
entropy as determined by Massey (closely related to Shannon’s
entropy) [8] to examine the security.
The work showed that if an offline exhaustive attack of the
passimage space were possible, the attack would not take very
long. They showed that in the Faces scheme, the inclination
of users’ choice towards attractive young females means it is
far less secure by calculation of guessing entropy. However,
as our work later shows, this is believed to be a result of
selection of each of the distractors from the remaining distinct
categories. The work we present in this paper provides further
contributions as it makes explicit the type of attack which
can be constructed to exploit preferences in user choice. It
also attempts the attack against different schemes and reports
the results, which provides concrete evidence to back up the
calculations of guessing entropy reported by Davis et al.. In
addition we show that the bias exists in other schemes, not
just in the Faces and Story schemes.
III. METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
A. Recognition-Based Graphical Password Schemes
In order to provide a basis of comparison, two recognition-
based schemes are used. The first is the “Doodles” scheme
[11] where black and white user drawings (doodles) are
used for authentication. This was selected as an example of
a recognition-based graphical password scheme where the
user is involved in the creation of the passimage. In the
authentication process, the user is presented with a screen
which shows 16 doodles of which one is their passimage and
the other 15 are distractors. A total of four such screens are
presented in order to complete the authentication. In [10] the
authors assert that the “guessability” is as shown in Equation
2
1
164
=
1
65536
(2)
The distractor selection algorithm for the doodles scheme
is based on a measure of similarity between any two doodles
(which is calculated based on the number of joins, black
regions and white regions of a doodle), images dissimilar to
the users doodle can be used as distractors.
The second scheme is a standard recognition-based scheme
which offers the user 144 potential images to select as their
“passimages” . This scheme was selected to represent ex-
amples of schemes where the user selects from a collection
of predetermined images.The scheme uses a selection of the
remaining images as the distractor images. To authenticate, the
user is presented with 4 screens, each with 9 images giving a
guessability as shown in Equation 3 .
1
94
=
1
6561
(3)
B. Experiments
Three stages are proposed:
1) Categorisation of the passimages of two recognition-
based schemes into non-overlapping semantic cate-
gories;
2) Examine the distribution of passimage choices between
these categories to determine the extent of user bias;
3) Exploiting the bias as extrapolated from the second step
by construction of an attack
The first stage involves splitting the passimages and pass-
doodles into non-overlapping semantic categories based on
their content. The process will be carried out separately for
both schemes resulting in a different set of categories for
each scheme. For the images scheme images were categorised
based on the prominent semantic content by the experiment
conductor. However the doodles scheme presented more of
a challenge, since the doodles used in this experiment were
collected years previously and it was not possible to ask the
users to categorise their own drawings.The categorisation of
the doodles reflects the user choice of doodle passimages.
The process of categorisation is described for both schemes
in Section III-C and Section III-E. Users will be asked to
select four images from the collection to create their graphical
password, these choices will be examined for bias towards
semantic categories. In the final experiment the potential for
an attack which uses the most commonly selected images as
the guess for a challenge screen will be examined. The rest
of Section III discusses the specifics of these experiments and
the corresponding results.
C. Categorisation of Image Passwords
144 digital images of objects are used to provide a selection
of images for users to select a portfolio (set) of four images as
their password. There are 12 categories for the images and are
as follows: Food and Drink, Cartoon and Fictional Characters,
Scenery, Animals, Faces and Body Parts, Transport, Clothing,
Entertainment, Trees plants and flowers, Skyscapes, Buildings
tools and devices, People. Each category has 12 images to
remove potential bias in the selection due to more images
being in any particular category.
D. Passimages User Selection Results
A total of 64 individuals participated, each selecting a com-
bination of 4 images, resulting in 256 passimage selections. As
expected, there was a bias in user selection. Of the 144 images,
42 images were not selected at all. Only the Scenery category
had every image selected by a user at least once. The most
unpopular category was “people” which showed images of
non-famous individuals. Food and drink was the most popular
category having 37 selections; cartoon characters came a close
second with 30 selections. The distribution of user choice of
images is shown in Figure 1 .
E. Categorisation of Doodle Passwords - Name That Doodle!
In order to obtain categories for the doodles, an initial
experiment was carried out which asked users to classify or
name doodles. It is proposed here that human classification is
appropriate for understanding how users select their doodles.
Since the users who created the doodle collection were not
contactable to ask what they drew, participants were asked
to categorise the doodles in collection. The purpose was to
minimize any ambiguity over doodle content.
Fig. 1. Doodle and Passimages Collection Semantic Categories Distribution
The following descriptions were used to define equivalence
(taken from the categories of classification as discussed by
Poet and Renaud [11]) same word; same concept, different
word ; different levels of category, same concept.Doodle
descriptions were deemed distinct if they fell into the following
categories: whole picture vs. detail; different perspective;
completely different concepts. Each doodle then had multiple
classifications, these were then further refined into categories
by applying a majority ruling. If the majority of classifications
fell into category X, then that doodle was in category X. The
results of this experiment are detailed in Section III-F.
F. Doodle User Selection Results
A total of 44 users (24 male and 20 female) participated in
the study providing amongst them 5012 classifications for the
collection of 735 doodles.
14 major semantic categories emerged, with 96% of classifi-
cations falling within these categories, 4% being un-namable.
12 categories matched those of the images, with an additional
two categories of “writing and numbers” and “artistic”, both of
which related specifically to drawing and writing. Writing and
numbers included doodles of letters, words, logos and numbers
whilst artistic contained squiggles, random art and shapes
. Classifications shown as examples are provided verbatim,
ignoring spelling and grammatical errors.
People (which included classifications such as “man”,“
female”, “people”, ), animals (which included classifications
such as “ cat”, “dog” and “animal”) and faces & body parts
(which included classifications such as “eye”, “ear”, “face”)
were by far the most popular classifications accounting for
33% of the classifications between them.
After the classifications had been analysed as detailed in
Section III-E the final dispersion of doodles between the cate-
gories was as shown in Figure 1, which also shows passimages
choice distribution. It should be noted that passimages had
two less categories (writing & numbers and artistic were not
included) since these categories did not apply to any images in
the collection. These results established the bias in user choice
towards images in particular categories.
G. Examining User Choice- Semantic Ordered Guessing At-
tack (SOGA)
In order to exploit the established bias in user choice,
we propose an attack which we call a “Semantic Ordered
Guessing Attack” (SOGA). In this attack the attacker has
knowledge of the most likely categories for graphical password
selection. This information could be obtained in a similar
method to that described in Sections III-C and III-E. The
attacker is then presented with an authentication challenge
screen which has the passimage or doodle and the selection
of distractors. The attacker then attempts to authenticate by
selecting the image from the most likely category given the
screen presented.
In order to examine the potential of a SOGA an experiment
was carried out to select distractor images and perform the
attack each of the passimages (doodles and images) multiple
times. A program was written to select each passimage/doodle,
along with its distractors (using the algorithm created by Poet
and Renaud for doodles, three variants on random selection
for images) .It was then recorded whether the password was
in the most likely category for the collection of distractors
selected and recorded the result. The results are presented in
Sections III-H and III-I.
H. Doodle SOGA
Each attack consisted of selection of a passdoodle and 15
distractor images (due to 15 distractors per challenge screen).
The attack then selected the doodle from the most common
category (using the ordering which is shown in Figure 1) and
checked to see if it was the passdoodle. The attack was carried
out for each of the 735 doodles 4 times (due to the 4 challenge
screens for successful authentication).
The attack was performed for each of the 735 doodles 4
times (due to the use of 4 challenge screens in the doodles
scheme). The results are displayed in Figure 2 where it can be
clearly seen that the SOGA was successful for approximately
15% of the 2940 screen attacks.
Taking the example of 15% of attacks on individual screens
being successful for the doodles scheme, the guessability is
given as 1164 =
1
65536 when using Equation 1 (4 screens with
16 doodles per screen). The guessability using the SOGA for
the doodles scheme is reported as 15% per screen, which
is equivalent to roughly 6.67 doodles per screen (obtained
by solving for x given the equation 1x = 0.15) which
results in a guessability of 16.674 for the four screens. This
is approximately 33 times higher than the guessability (for
random guessing) calculated using Equation 1 with 16 doodles
for 4 screens.
I. Passimages SOGA
The approach taken was similar to that of the attack when
performed on the doodles scheme. However, in contrast to the
doodles scheme, each user selected image is not unique and
so the number of iterations per passimage was dependent on
the number of times it was selected by users. Each image was
used as a passimage (for each time a user selected the image)
and had distractors selected using each of three algorithms
.The results were then analysed by ordering the collection
of selected distractors categories and passimage category by
popularity as discovered in our study. The number of instances
where the passimage was in the most common category given
the user choice bias (displayed in Figure 1) was then counted.
The results of the SOGA for the passimages scheme are
shown in Figure 2. It can be seen from this figure that
the most resistant distractor selection algorithm was random
selection from categories other than the passimage category,
which resulted in the attack working against 20% of the 256
passimage challenge screens (64 users who selected 4 images
each). Performing the calculation (as we did for the doodle
scheme) to determine the increase on chances of guessing
when compared to random guessing probability (as presented
in Equation 1) this meant a guessing attack using this approach
is 10.5 times more probable than random guessing.
The second most effective algorithm was random selection,
which resulted in the attack working for 21% of the 256
passimage challenge screens. This related to an increase on the
probability of guessing of 12.8 times. The worst performance
came from selection of distinct categories which resulted in
the attack working for 23% of the 256 passimage challenge
screens. this meant a guessing attack using this approach is 18
times more likely to be successful than random guessing. This
was as expected, since there is a user bias in image selection
towards more popular images, it follows that if you select
from the remaining categories when a user has selected from
a highly popular category, the distractors will be from less
likely categories giving perfect conditions for the proposed
attack.
IV. COMPUTING THE GUESSABILITY
We now propose a way of calculating the “revised guess-
ability” for recognition-based graphical password schemes
(where the images can be separated into distinct categories).
This value is intended to be a more accurate reflection of
the guessability when compared to those calculated without
considering user bias. This is done by calculating the “revised”
number of passimages per challenge screen and calculating the
guessability using Equation 1 with this value. The steps are
as follows:
1) Collect a sample of user selected images, a larger sample
is better
2) Establish the bias in user choice by examining the
categories of the passimages selected and ordering the
categories from most to least popular
3) Calculate the revised number of images per screen by
solving Equation 4 for x, the revised number of images
per challenge screen.
1
x
=
percentage of successful attacks
100
(4)
4) Finally, calculate the revised guessability as 1xn where
x is as calculated in Equation 4 and n is the number of
challenge screens.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
15% of attacks against doodles challenge screens were suc-
cessful. Whilst 21% of passimage screens were successfully
attacked where distractors were selected randomly (ignoring
the semantic categories). 23% of passimage screens were
successfully attacked where distractors were selected from
distinct passimage categories (excluding the passimage cat-
egory) and 20% of screens were successfully attacked where
distractors were selected from passimage categories (excluding
the passimage category).
These figures relate to attacks on individual screens, the
attacks are made more difficult by a number of challenge
screens. Passimage guessability varied between 10 and 18
times larger than predicted using Equation 1 for 9 images with
Fig. 2. Percentage of Successful SOGA for Each Scheme Variation
4 screens. The guessability is 33 times higher than calculated
when using 16 images for 4 screens. To compare the two
values, one must calculate the increase in guessability for the
doodles scheme where 9 images are used per screen. This
figure is approximately 3.3 times higher than predicted using
Equation 1 which is noticeably smaller than the passimage
results.
These results demonstrate how guessability of recognition-
based graphical password schemes can be affected by user
choice. This work supports the work of Davis et al. [4] and
shows that the bias exists in other recognition-based schemes.
We also showed how a guessing attack might be constructed to
exploit this bias which we called a semantic ordered guessing
attack. Following from this, we presented a method to calculate
the revised guessability of a recognition-based scheme where
the images can be split into distinct categories.
The main conclusion which can be drawn from the results
reported here is that the hypothesis that user choice in passim-
ages will have a detrimental effect on the level of security of
recognition-based schemes is valid to a varying degree. The
extent of the effect is dependent on the distractor selection
algorithm ignoring bias in user selection. To minimise attacks,
a distractor selection algorithm should not attempt to select
less popular images for a challenge screen but instead em-
mulate random selection and preferably have a large range of
categories for passimages. An alternative could be to show
images from the same category, though this could reduce
memorability.
Given the results we discovered in our studies, we suggest
that to maximise potential security of a recognition-based
scheme users should not be allowed to pick their own pictures,
though it remains to be seen how this might affect memora-
bility of such schemes. This work examines only guessing in
terms of a bias in general image choice and does not consider
guessing for a specific user, thus there is room to examine the
use of social engineering tactics to guess a users pictures.
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